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CHAPTER 17
The Prospects for Arbitration 
in the Nonunion Sector
Trevor Bain
Rights disputes arise from the claim of an aggrieved worker that 
there has been a violation of a collective agreement, of the provisions 
of work rules, of unilateral management policies, including disciplin 
ary rules, or of provisions of an individual contract of employment. 
There may also be situations in which management claims that its 
rights have not been respected. This is different from interest disputes, 
which are disagreements over the terms of a collective agreement. Col 
lective bargaining contract negotiations are a legislative process 
through which the law of the workplace is jointly determined. The 
usual mechanism for resolving disputes over rights in the unionized 
setting in the United States is a joint labor-management grievance pro 
cedure with the final step of binding arbitration. Without this judicial 
system, every time there is a dispute over the application of the con 
tract at the workplace a strike is necessary to resolve the issue by force. 
Or, every time one party chooses to ignore the contract it can be 
enforced only by a strike or a lockout. The grievance procedure culmi 
nating in arbitration makes contract administration viable.
Grievance procedures are not new to labor-management relations 
(Fleming 1965). The first recorded instance of voluntary arbitration in 
the United States took place in 1865 in a dispute involving the iron 
puddlers of Pittsburgh (Smith 1992). The best known grievance proce 
dure during the early twentieth century was established in a 1911 
agreement between Hart, Schafner and Marx clothing manufacturers 
and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union. Employee representa 
tion plans in the 1920s are characterized as a large grievance commit-
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tee through which management could learn of workers' complaints 
(Chamberlain 1951). Employee representation plans that sought to 
avoid the union were declared illegal under the National Labor Rela 
tions Act (1935). But the greatest growth in grievance arbitration began 
during World War II. The National War Labor Board (WLB) encour 
aged unions and employers to include an arbitration clause in their 
agreements and sometimes required it. When the parties didn't agree 
on an arbitrator, the WLB appointed one. President Truman convened a 
Labor-Management Conference in 1945, and George Taylor of the 
University of Pennsylvania reported that one of the few agreements by 
the parties to that conference was that arbitration would be the final 
step in a grievance procedure (U.S. Department of Labor 1994). This 
laid the foundation for the practice of ending the grievance procedure 
with the final step of arbitration. That was an important change from 
the 1920s employee representation plans, which were internal plans 
without the use of an impartial neutral. Arbitration became the quid pro 
quo for ending strikes. The grievance procedure eliminated strikes over 
grievances and brought stability and predictability to the bargaining 
relationship.
Federal statutes that affect the grievance procedure and arbitration in 
the private sector are the Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA) in 
1947 and the Railway Labor Act (RLA) in 1926. The LMRA, Section 
301, authorizes suits in federal courts for violation of collective agree 
ments and, in 1959, the Supreme Court held that Section 301 autho 
rized federal district courts to enforce arbitration provisions in 
collective bargaining agreements. In 1960, the Supreme Court, in three 
cases termed the "Steelworkers' Trilogy," took major steps to fashion a 
federal law of labor arbitration that gave legal substance to an arbitra 
tor's award. The results of these three cases can be summarized as: the 
courts should send to arbitration all disputes subject to the arbitration 
clause; interpretation of the agreement is for the arbitrator and not the 
courts; courts should not reject an award unless the arbitrator exceeded 
the authority under the contract; courts should not reexamine the mer 
its of a grievance; and awards need not be set aside for incompleteness. 
Many of the states followed the direction of the federal government, 
and by 1975, three-fourths of the states had enacted an arbitration stat 
ute.
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The grievance procedure culminating in final and binding arbitration 
that developed in the unionized sector became so admired that it has 
been adopted as alternative dispute resolution (ADR) to resolve dis 
putes related to divorce, the environment, construction, consumer 
claims, and customer claims against brokerage firms. While practitio 
ners and scholars of labor arbitration continue to debate arbitration's 
future in the unionized sector, the discussion of its application to the 
nonunion sector has exploded.
The final report of the Commission on the Future of Worker-Man 
agement Relations (1994), usually called the Dunlop Commission, 
encourages the development of in-house dispute resolution procedures, 
while the Worker Representation and Participation Survey conducted 
by Freeman and Rogers (1995) reported that the majority of respon 
dents were favorably disposed to using arbitration to resolve disputes. 
The question is whether what works so well in the unionized sector and 
appears to work well in many other ADR situations can be an effective 
means of employee protection in nonunion employment.
The objectives of this paper are to assess the current coverage and 
legal status of nonunion arbitration; evaluate what has been learned 
from private sector labor arbitration as a guide to the nonunion sector; 
examine the issues related to the use of arbitration in the nonunion sec 
tor; present some recommendations for improving its use; and assess 
the probability of its success in the nonunion sector.
Coverage and Legal Status
Considerably less is known about the extent and nature of alterna 
tive dispute resolution procedures for nonunion employees than for 
union employees. A Conference Board study (Berenbein 1980) sur 
veyed the nonunion companies and concluded that two-thirds of them 
had adopted some type of grievance procedure by 1978. A survey con 
ducted by Ichniowski and Lewin (1988) found that about one-half of 
nonunion business lines in each occupational group have a procedure 
for processing employee grievances with a low of 43.7 percent for 
managers and a high of 54.4 percent for production workers. They also 
reported that the growth in ADR procedures is more recent in the non-
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union sector than the union sector, covering 5 percent of all occupa 
tional groups in 1960 and growing by four to five times between 1960 
and 1980.
Arbitration is increasingly being used in statutory rights cases. The 
motivation for the employer to initiate ADR is less union avoidance 
than the fear of court suits and large settlements for the employee, par 
ticularly with regard to employment discrimination claims. The popu 
lar literature indicates that employers favor ADR to court litigation but 
that they initiate mechanisms which do not use third-party neutrals. A 
recent survey of 2,000 businesses with 100 or more employees by 
theU.S. General Accounting Office (1995) found that all private 
employers used some type of internal ADR procedure to resolve dis 
crimination suits. Negotiation and fact finding were used most often, 
while arbitration was one of the least common approaches; some 
employers using arbitration make it mandatory for all workers.
The possibility of arbitrating employment discrimination claims 
arose after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In Alexander v. 
Gardner Denver Co., the Supreme Court held that the employees' right 
in a unionized setting to sue under Title VII was not precluded by the 
arbitrator's award. 1 However, the Supreme Court's attitude toward arbi 
tration of statutory claims has changed. In the case of Gilmer v. Inter 
state/Johnson Lane Corp., Gilmer, a brokerage employee, was 
required to sign an agreement to arbitrate any controversy arising out 
of employment or termination of employment. 2 Gilmer filed a com 
plaint against his former employer under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act and the Supreme Court held that his claim was 
required to go to arbitration. Ever since Gilmer, more employers are 
moving toward employees signing agreements to arbitrate all disputes 
arising out of their employment. Advantages to the employer of such 
an agreement are: the avoidance of punitive damages under the 1991 
amendments to Title VII, and the ability to keep arbitration decisions 
confidential. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has 
also announced that it will initiate a voluntary ADR program using 
mediation to handle some of the nearly 100,000 discrimination charges 
it receives each year. The program will select employees and employ 
ers to work with a neutral mediator to settle disputes.
Of Heart and Mind 361
Lessons from the Union Sector
ADR procedures vary in formality, ranging from an informal "open 
door policy," through a corporate ombudsman, to a grievance and arbi 
tration procedure. Lewin and Peterson (1988) identify the four func 
tions of the grievance procedure as compliance, adjudicative, 
administrative, and political. The grievance procedure also introduces 
the notion of fairness, or distributive and procedural justice, into the 
workplace. Gordon (1988) defines distributive justice as the perceived 
fairness of the allocation of company resources among employees and 
procedural justice as the perceived fairness of the process through 
which decisions are made to allocate company resources. The literature 
on union grievance procedures can be divided into three areas by fol 
lowing the steps of the grievance procedure: (1) determinants of griev 
ance initiation and activity, (2) determinants of grievance resolution 
and settlement, and (3) determinants of grievance effectiveness. To 
adapt this literature to the nonunion firm we substitute the employee 
handbook for the contract and employee-management relations for 
union-management relations.
With regard to the determinants of grievance initiation and activity, 
grievance initiation can be viewed by employers as a benefit to the firm 
because it can serve as a voice for worker discontent. Workers may 
choose to initiate grievances rather than exit the company or stay away 
from work, both of which are costly to the firm. The research indicates 
that the process can be improved with programs that provide employ 
ees and supervisors with the skills to effectively use the grievance pro 
cedure (Bemmels, Reshef, and Stratton-Devine 1991). Changes in 
technology and stress in the work environment were also likely to 
increase grievance activity (Peach and Livernash 1974, Muchinsky and 
Maassaran 1980).
With regard to the determinants of grievance resolution and settle 
ment, the clearer the contract language with regard to the rights and 
facts of a grievance, the more likely it is to be resolved (Meyer and 
Cooke 1988). A case's resolution also effects relations between 
employees and management (Gordon and Bowlby 1988). When a case 
is settled in favor of management, relations deteriorate between the 
employee and both lower- and higher-level management, but the rela-
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tionship is unchanged when the grievant wins. Lewin and Peterson 
(1988) conclude that the larger the unit, the higher the steps at which 
grievances were settled and the slower the speed of settlements. Expe 
dited grievance procedures were found to raise the employees' and 
managers' perceptions of the equity of a grievance settlement, and 
experience in handling a grievances also affects resolution.
With regard to the determinants of grievance effectiveness, the prin 
cipal benefits to employees from the grievance procedure are that it 
provides a mechanism for due process and that it can be perceived as 
providing a procedure for fairness in dealing with the issues (Gordon 
1988). For the union, it demonstrates the union's role in representing 
the membership. The benefits for management may include a reduction 
in work slowdowns and improvement in the company's economic per 
formance. The possibility of multiple benefits leads researchers to 
agree that effectiveness is not a single concept (Clark and Gallagher 
1988), but instead depends on which party is being discussed. Com 
pared with a conventional contract, the union-management relationship 
is a continuing one. The same can be said for the employee-employer 
relationship, and the benefits of a grievance procedure or the settlement 
of a grievance may extend into the future.
Additional measures of effectiveness are related to the grievance 
procedure as providing a mechanism for workplace justice or proce 
dural justice and serving as a collective voice for union members. The 
grievance procedure can provide procedural justice, since it lays out 
how decisions are made, and distributive justice, since there are conse 
quences of the decisions. Gordon and Miller (1984) find little research 
that either supports or refutes the contention that grievance procedures 
promote workplace justice. With regard to the common law rights of 
workers, Knight (1986) concludes that the grievance process has not 
expanded rights beyond the specific contract.
It is difficult to come up with a simple conclusion or set of conclu 
sions of the grievance process based on the literature (Peterson 1992). 
There are, however, several conclusions that can be drawn from the 
research. A labor-management contract that is clear and free of ambi 
guities reduces grievances and leads to early settlements. The same 
analogy can be used for the employee handbook. Feedback to union 
officials and management also assists early settlements. This analogy 
can be used for employees and management. Finally a good industrial
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relations climate, for both union and nonunion firms, reduces grievance 
filing, speeds settlement, and increases productivity.
Issues in Adaptation
If employers were to initiate a grievance procedure that results in 
final and binding arbitration, a process which currently does not exist 
in most organizations, what are the issues to be resolved?
First is the issue of a contract between the employer and employee. 
The employer has made the rules of employment and may or may not 
have set them down in an employee handbook. If not, there is no con 
tract, or law of the workplace, for the employee to work with. The right 
to challenge management decisions and the procedure for doing it have 
to be clearly set out in some communication, such as a handbook, that 
every employee knows about and is required to read.
Second is the acceptance of arbitration by employees. Insight into 
how employees view arbitration as a vehicle for resolving disputes 
over employment issues is provided by the Freeman and Rogers survey 
(1995). A large fraction of employees view courts and agencies as 
vehicles for resolving disputes concerning employment issues. How 
ever, when asked whether they would prefer an alternative system to 
deal with disputes in which an elected committee of employees and 
management would jointly choose an outside arbitrator to resolve the 
dispute, approximately 55 percent of employees said they would prefer 
the alternative system, while 37 percent wanted to go to court or to an 
agency. The employees who responded to the survey were favorably 
disposed to using arbitration to resolve disputes, but most employees 
want such a system to be jointly administered by employees and man 
agement. This result addresses the issue of perceived fairness and jus 
tice.
Third is employee representation. In the union setting, the employee 
is represented by the union but few employees have the ability to 
present their own case effectively. Even the most effective employee 
would face experienced management representatives. Employees could 
be represented or accompanied by fellow employees, but they would 
still not possess the expertise that management has in presenting their
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case to the arbitrator. Therefore, effective representation involves the 
expense of hiring a lawyer. Without the union there should be some 
provision for an employee advocate or the perception of justice may be 
undermined. Eighty-two percent of the employees (Freeman and Rog 
ers 1995) want a system in which "expert help" is available to the 
grieving employee.
Fourth is the selection of an arbitrator. The evidence indicates that 
the selection of a neutral outside party, especially in the formation of 
the procedure, is important. Employees must perceive the arbitrator as 
fair and competent. A controversy exists within the National Academy 
of Arbitrators (NAA) as to whether members should hear grievances 
under arbitration procedures established by nonunion employers. In a 
survey conducted by Nye (1994), more than 90 percent of the arbitra 
tors indicated a conditional willingness to serve and more than 54 per 
cent had done so.
Fifth involves compensation for the arbitrator. The employee may 
not be able to pay part of the arbitrator's compensation, particularly if 
there has been a discharge. The perception of procedural and distribu 
tive justice that both parties should accept may not be present if the 
issue is not resolved to the employees' satisfaction and the arbitrator 
has been paid by the employer. Forty-three percent of respondents to 
the Freeman and Rogers Survey (1995) want management and employ 
ees to pay the expenses of the system.
Sixth is enforcement of the arbitrators award. There is at present no 
machinery for enforcement other than the courts. If the employer 
ignores the arbitrator's decision, the grievant has no choice but to 
employ a lawyer and go to court for enforcement.
Seventh is whether employers can require employees to use ADR as 
a condition of employment. By almost a 4-1 margin, employees 
believe that such a requirement should be illegal (Freeman and Rogers 
1995). There are currently some limitations to the employers' ability to 
force employees to arbitrate their claims of employment discrimina 
tion. No case requiring arbitration of an employee's claims, not even 
Gilmer, has expressly overruled Alexander v. Gardner Denver Corp. , 
which suggests that unionized employees claiming discrimination may 
still pursue judicial claims separate and distinct from their claims 
under the collective agreement. Whether the court would extend this 
right in the nonunion setting hasn't been decided. The cases requiring
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arbitration of discrimination claims have all involved some agreement 
other than an employment contract as the vehicle imposing the obliga 
tion to arbitrate. In Gilmer and other securities industry cases it was a 
stock exchange registration agreement that contained the arbitration 
agreement, and in Williams v. Katten, Muchin & Zavis, the law firm's 
partnership agreement imposed the obligation to arbitrate 3 Another 
consideration limiting the trend to force arbitration stems from a recent 
decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit. In Prudential 
Insurance Co. of America v. Lai, it was held that an employee must 
have knowingly agreed to waive the right to a judicial forum in order to 
be forced to arbitrate discrimination claims.4 The Supreme Court on 
October 2, 1995 let stand this ruling.
Finally, the employee's agreement to arbitrate employment disputes 
must also be voluntary. A federal district court in Houston recently 
ordered an employer to cease and desist from requiring employees to 
sign an arbitration agreement; employees who refused to sign were 
fired. The court held that forcing employees to give up their right to 
resort to the courts for resolution of employment discrimination claims 
violated Title VII.
Recommendations
Companies use ADR to reduce litigation costs, to avoid unions, or to 
increase employee satisfaction. Appeals procedures vary in formality, 
ranging from the least formal "open door policy," through a corporate 
ombudsman, to a grievance and arbitration procedure. The Brown and 
Root System described in the Dunlop Report (U.S. Department of 
Labor 1994b), includes an open door policy, successive steps, media 
tion, and arbitration. A great deal of the research on this topic is anec 
dotal. Some of it is reported by Peterson and Peterson (1987). If 
arbitration is to be the only recourse available to employees short of 
exiting the company, then arbitration must be seen as neutral. The val 
ues and expectations of employees may determine the acceptance of a 
formal grievance procedure (Gundry and Briggs 1993). Employees 
who identify with the organization are less likely to need a formal pro 
cedure and less likely to go as far as arbitration (Boroff 1994). The
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payoff to the employee is not as apparent as the payoff to the employer. 
With the limited judgment authority available to arbitrators, the cost to 
the company is significantly less than a comparable lawsuit. Therefore, 
employer-initiated arbitration is likely to expand in all sized firms and 
not just in large and medium-size firms where most human resources 
innovations occur. The GAO report (1995) found no statistically signif 
icant difference in use of arbitration based on business size.
The GAO report also echoes what many critics of employer-initiated 
grievance systems have said: employers use ADR to resolve discrimi 
nation complaints, and fairness is not always part of these systems. 
Quality standards that should be implemented to bring fairness to non 
union arbitration procedures are identified by the Dunlop Commission 
(1994) as:
 a neutral arbitrator who knows the laws in question and under 
stands the concerns of the parties
  a fair and simple method by which the employee can secure the 
necessary information to present his or her claim;
  a fair method of cost-sharing between the employer and employee 
to ensure affordable access to the system for all employees
  the right to independent representation if the employee wants it
  a range of remedies equal to those available through litigation
  a written opinion by the arbitrator explaining the rationale for the 
result
  sufficient judicial review to ensure that the result is consistent with 
the government laws
The Future
Arbitration provides employees and employers with a great 4eal of 
flexibility to resolve employment relationship disputes without resort 
ing to the courts. It can be quicker, less costly, and less adversarial, as 
long as both parties view it as providing an equitable forum. While the 
parties may disagree over the results of arbitration in the unionized set-
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ting, the process is viewed as being fair. However, the same cannot be 
said for arbitration in the nonunion setting. There is considerable ine 
quality in economic power between employees and employers in the 
nonunion setting, and in order for arbitration to succeed as an alterna 
tive to the courts, equity and fairness standards have to be assured for 
employer-initiated procedures. This may require installing some insti 
tution or activity that gives nonunion employees some of the economic 
power they gain in the unionized setting, including binding arbitration.
NOTES
1 415 U.S. 147(1974)
2. 500 U.S 20(1991)
3. 837 F Supp. 1430 (N D 211 , E D , 1993).
4. 66 FEP Cases 933 (9th Cir. 1994)
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